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NEGUGENCE - REs lPsA LOQurrtJR - DoC'rR.INE APPLmD ALTHOUGH 
DAMAGE CAUSING INSTRUMENTALITY WlTIIIN THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OP' 
DEFENDANT AT THE TIME OF THE DAMAGE - Seven months after defendant 
had installed a washbowl in a bathroom in plaintiff's house, the house was 
damaged by water when one of the pipes became disconnected from a 
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faucet. During the two weeks immediately prior to the damage the house 
was unoccupied, but inspections were made every two or three days by 
plaintiff's employee. Plaintiff sued defendant to recover for the damage 
caused by defendant's alleged negligence in connecting the water pipe to 
the washbowl. In a trial to the court, the evidence tended to eliminate 
other possible causes of the disconnection, such as rough use or manufac-
turing fault. The trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiff, relying upon 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On appeal, held, affirmed. Proof of de-
fendant's control of the damage causing instrumentality at the time of the 
alleged negligence will suffice to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if 
the plaintiff reasonably eliminates other possible intervening causes of the 
damage. Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co., 99 N.W. 2d 779 (Minn. 
1959). 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence1 permits an in-
ference2 of negligence which ordinarily places on the defendant the burden 
of explaining the injury and rebutting the inference. Application of the 
doctrine is usually restricted to cases in which the defendant at the time of 
damage is in the exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the injury.3 
However, in the principal case the court applied the doctrine although de-
fendant had not been in control of the disconnected pipe for more than 
seven months. Reasoning from its assumption that the question of when 
the doctrine should be invoked is actually a question of how justice would 
be most practically and fairly administered,4 the court held the doctrine 
applicable if defendant was in exclusive control of the pipe at the time of 
the alleged negligence.ti 
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is justified when all 
the usual prerequisites6 are present because logic and common experience 
then indicate that defendant is negligent. The burden of rebutting the 
l See PRossER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940). 
2 A minority of courts hold that the doctrine shifts the burden of going forward with 
evidence; two or three regard it as shifting the burden of proof. See generally PROSSER, 
TORTS §43 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. 
L. REv. 241 (1936). 
3 See PROSSER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. (1940). 
4 Principal case at 782. 
5 The court cites as precedent: Peterson v. Minnesota Power &: Light Co., 207 Minn. 
387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940) (injury following fifteen days of normal use after installation of 
stove by defendant, defendant also in control of the electric power which might have 
caused the injury); Saunders v. Walker, 229 La. 426, 86 So.2d 89 (1956) (damage four 
months after repair of an air conditioning unit). See also Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 
266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954) (injury involving sealed unit in refrigerator nearly 
three years after purchase). But compare Bluett v. Eli Skating Club, 133 Conn. 99, 48 A.2d 
557 (1946) (plaintiff injured while roller skating a few minutes after skate adjusted by 
defendant). 
6 In addition to the exclusive control requirement it is usually said that the injury 
must be a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone was negligent, and that 
the injury must not be due to any voluntary act of plaintiff. See generally PROSSER, TORTS 
§42 (2d ed. 1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940). 
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inference is not unduly onerous since the defendant usually has better access 
to the evidence than does plaintiff.7 But the relaxation of the prerequisite 
of exclusive control evidenced by the principal case does in two respects bear 
upon the fairness of the doctrine. First, the inference of negligence is 
weaker since the longer defendant has been out of control of the instru-
mentality, the greater is the possibility that some agency other than de-
fendant caused the injury. Second, the more remote in time and distance 
defendant is at the time of the damage, the less likely he is to have access to 
evidence which might rebut the inference of negligence, either by proving 
that he was not negligent8 or by showing that some other force caused the 
damage.9 Thus, the application of res ipsa loquitur in a case like the 
principal one may have the practical effect of imposing strict liability on a 
defendant, for it puts upon him a virtually impossible burden of rebuttal. 
Some writers have recognized this close relationship between res ipsa 
loquitur and strict liability.10 When the doctrine is extended to cover 
cases in which defendant is not in exclusive control at the time of the 
damage, it becomes less a rule of evidence and more a substantive rule of law. 
The resulting strict liability can sometimes be justified, as in the "exploding 
bottle" cases,11 where the bottler must realize that a certain number of 
bottles will explode and is in effect taking that risk when he intentionally 
puts the bottle in commerce.12 In the instant case there seems to be no 
good reason for extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiff 
rather than defendant had the exclusive right of inspection and access to the 
facts at the time and place of the damage. If it is conceded that neither 
party is in a position to explain the incident, there appears to be little rea-
son to shift the loss to defendant who may well be innocent, and who is in 
no better position to insure against or bear the loss than is plaintiff. 
Kenneth Laing, Jr., S.Ed. 
7 See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §309 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, EvmENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940) 
(stating that the justice of the rule consists in the circumstance that the evidence is acces• 
sible to defendant). But see PROSSER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE 
LAW OF TORTS §19.9 (1956). 
8 See, e.g., Dunning v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 270 Ky. 44, 109 S.W .2d 6 (1937); Oliver 
v. Union Transfer Co., 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S.W.2d 478 (1934). The difficulty in trying 
to prove a broad "negative" (lack of negligence) by testimony that he was careful is illus• 
trated by defendant's attempt in the principal case, at 782, 783. PROSSER, TORTS §43 n.23 
(2d ed. 1955), states, "As the defendant's evidence approaches definite proof that the defect 
could not be present, it is all the more clearly rebutted by the fact that the defect is there." 
See also 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§19.11, 19.12 (1956). 
9 See, e.g., Tyreco Refining Co. v. Cook, 110 S.W .2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 
10 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§19.5, 19.12 (1956). 
11 See, e.g., Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W .2d 573 (1952); 
Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925). But see Loebig's Guardian v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W.2d 910 (1935). 
12 For a case in which the court considers this policy aspect in applying the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, see Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 11. But compare Loebig's 
Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 11. 
